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Area of intended focus: Finance
1. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT & OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this research proposal is to explore the extent to which credit derivatives
can be used effectively by domestic financial institutions, in particular, Commercial Banks
to hedge the credit risk associated with lending to the Small, Medium and Micro
enterprise (SMME) market segment, thereby making lending to this market segment an
attractive and viable banking proposition.
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SECTION A : INTRODUCTION
2. Background and Summary of the Proposal:
The financial services sector in South Africa has come under severe criticism from
Government, trade unions and the unbanked, low income earners for not fulfilling their
social responsibility, in terms of, not banking the Small, Medium and Micro enterprise
(SMME) customer base . In particular, financial institutions have been accused of ignoring
or not giving sufficient attention to the financial/credit needs of this market segment.
These parties have argued that many ofthe domestic financial institutions are applying
standard credit criteria to this market segment, which they feel is incorrect. This has often
resulted in SMME's having their requests for credit facilities declined by domestic
financial institutions and then having to resort to approaching unscrupulous "loan sharks"
for credit facilities, which facilities are often made available to them at exorbitant interest
rates. The alleged reluctance on the part of domestic financial services institutions to make
available credit facilities, in the form of start-up business loans and asset-based finance to
the SMME segment has possibly hindered economic growth, productivity, employment
and resulted indirectly in a host of other social anomalies. Alister Ruiters of the
Department of Trade and Industry has been publicly vociferous in his attack on domestic
financial institutions (Business Day, August18, 1999). It would appear these financial
institutions are only prepared to do business with this market segment in partnership with
Government, where Government bears a large proportion ofthe risk by providing
guarantees or indemnities on behalf of the client. Examples of such guarantees include
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Khula and Sizabantu guarantees issued by agencies controlled within the ambit ofthe
Department of Trade and Industry.
Financial service institutions have defended their actions by countering that the credit risk
attached to making loans available to the SMME market segment is often unacceptable to
them. Many of these potential clients are characterised by adverse credit records, show
little stability, in terms of, employment and domicilium and often do not have any tangible
collateral available to support their loan requests. That is, the risk from lending to this
market segment far outweighs the potential returns. Further, these financial institutions
have argued that with South Africa having been accepted into the international fold and
following the accelerated pace ofglobalisation, new markets have opened up for their
shareholders. Hence, shareholders are requiring improved returns (capital gains and/or
dividends); else they are at liberty to move their funds to other investment destinations.
The pressure on domestic financial institutions to deliver consistently better returns on
equity has been and continues to be a difficult one. This is exacerbated by the increasing
competitive pressure from both retail competitors who are now offering financial services,
such as Pick 'n Pay Financial Services, Woolworth's, and foreign financial institutions,
who have entered the domestic scene. For many of the retail competitors the offering of
financial services is seen merely as an extension of their product line. Existing
infrastructure, in the form of, branches /outlets and technology are largely already in place.
Further, they are not bound by the same liquidity reserve requirements imposed by the
South African Reserve Bank (SARB), as are the domestic financial institutions they now
compete against. Hence, the retail competitors' profit margins are likely to be higher .
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Further, as many of the foreign financial institutions are not constrained by the same social
responsibility obligations local financial institutions face and as they have not invested
substantially in branch networks and other infrastructure in South Africa, their profit
margins are higher and hence their returns on equity is likely to be significantly higher than
the domestic financial institutions.
Following the increasing popularity of Credit Derivatives in countries, such as, the United
States of America, the United Kingdom and India, it is my intention to explore whether
this instrument can be used effectively by domestic financial institutions as an hedging tool
to insure against what they might otherwise consider unacceptable risk in the SMME
market segment. That is, will the use of credit derivatives make the lending of funds to this
client base an acceptable or attractive proposition to domestic financial institutions.
However, we first need to define credit risk and credit derivatives before we proceed
further. Creditex (Commentary,May 2001) defines credit risk as:
"the risk ofloss following default. "
PriceWaterhouseCoopers defines a credit derivative as :
"a credit risk management instrument that allows a financial
institution to transfer credit risk to another party".
Having, in simple terms, defined what we mean by credit risk and credit derivatives, we
proceed by suggesting how credit derivatives can be used as an effective hedging tool and
also some ofthe possible shortcomings that may be associated with the use of credit
derivatives in South Africa. Cheow and Chiu (Managing Credit Risks, May 23,2001)
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suggest credit derivatives have the potential to transform the way in which Commercial
Banks do business. The impact of credit derivatives is likely to result in changes in Bank's
operating and credit models of assessment, pricing policies and offer insight into how
products and services may be developed and implemented. Traditionally Banks appear to
have been involved in all aspects oflending from origination to administration, monitoring
and collection. These authors suggest the resulting credit model emanating from the use of
credit derivatives is likely to only concentrate on origination of the loan with the view of
later selling-off the book itselfor insuring the credit risk. This latter alternative involves
credit derivatives.
We turn our attention to highlighting some possible constraints to the effective use of
credit derivatives in South Africa. These are as follows :
.. Lack of effective infrastructure
.. Lack of liquidity
.. Lack Of Transparency
.. Restrictive Central Bank regulations and exchange controls
.. limited number of large financial institutions
3. The Problem Statement and objectives of the Study: A detailed look
The objective of this research proposal is to explore whether credit derivatives can be used
effectively by domestic financial institutions, in particular, Commercial Banks to hedge the
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credit risk associated with lending to the SMME market segment, thereby making lending
to this market segment an attractive and viable banking proposition.
The growing acceptance and popularity of credit derivatives in countries, such as, India
and Australia prompts one to consider whether this instrument cannot be used effectively
in the South African context. The research will need to consider such aspects as the risk
rating of South Africa as an investment destination, the standing of local Commercial
Banks internationally, the Commercial Bank's internal credit risk rating models applied to
the SMME market segments, the local financial markets and exchanges/bourses, markets
for credit derivatives and legislative constraints.
4. The Research Design and Methodology :
Research design involves defining the framework which links the various variables
identified in the study. It guides the selection of sources and types of information and
outlines procedures for each research activity (Cooper & Schindler, 2001).
4.1. The Research Approach:
An exploratory study approach has been adopted in order to gain a better understanding
of the dilemma facing both Commercial Bankers on the one hand and their critics, namely
Government, Unions and the SMME market segment on the other. A qualitative research
approach has been adopted; in particular, in-depth interviewing and for expert
interviewing has been used together with document analysis. The research undertaken has
analysed a selective, yet vast amount of the secondary data available on, for example,
credit derivatives, risks associated with lending to the SMME market segments, South
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African Reserve Bank: (SARB) briefs and studies undertaken by the South African
Department of Trade & Industry on the SMME market segments. An analysis of the
secondary data on these issues pertaining to other developed and less developed
economies has also been undertaken with a view to drawing on similarities and practical
applications adaptable to the South African context.
Experience surveys have been undertaken with the relevant Commercial Bank: senior
executives involved with the SMME market segments, their treasury counterparts and the
appropriate SARB and/or Department of Trade & Industry officials. The rationale behind
this is questions, such as, what has been attempted in the past with limited success, who is
involved in the decision-making, what potential problem areas and barriers can be
identified and so on, has been addressed.
4.2. Sampling Design:
Whilst acknowledging the superiority of probability sampling, this technique does not lend
itself to the objectives of this research study. Instead, this study will utilise non-probability
sampling due to the fact the sample, it is believed, needs to be more purposive. In
particular, it is proposed purposive and snowball-sampling techniques will be used in the
study.
4.3. The Measurement Technique adopted
& the Techniques used for data analysis :
The characteristics of sound measurement are that it must be valid, reliable and practica1.
As this study used interviews and questionaires, the resulting response method does not
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easily lend itselfto comparability, ranking or rating techniques. Hence and in order to
make the responses more qualitative the interviewee has been asked specific questions
covering only one facet of the topic at any time and/or the respondent has been asked to
judge one property at a time. In this way, the responses / data have been made qualitative
thereby allowing for ranking or rating techniques to be used.
Some ofthe rating scales that the study has employed are simple category scales (where
two mutually exclusive responses are rated, for example, important or unimportant),
multiple response scales( checklist), the Likert scale (rating of statements expressing either
a favourable or unfavourable attitude towards the subject matter) and stapel scales.
SECTION B : A SYNOPSIS OF THE SMME MARKET
We begin by reviewing the Small, Medium and Micro-enterprise market in South Africa,
with a particular, focus on the problems encountered by this market segment in obtaining
finance from domestic banks.
5. Financial Access for SMME's
This discussion document (A Draft Discussion Document - Department of Trade and
Industry, Centre for Small Business Promotion, April 1998) was drafted with input from
Government, parastatal agencies and the private sector with a view to highlighting the role
of Small, Medium and microenterprises (SMMEs) in meeting the national objectives set
out in the Government's Reconstruction and Development Programme and the
Government's Macroeconomic Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
Strategy. Further, the document seeks to analyse the gaps in the supply of financial
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services to SMMEs, with an examination of possible causes of insufficient financial
services provision to SMMEs (including constraints by formal and alternative financial
institutions) and concludes by suggesting ways to overcome some of these impediments.
The document suggests the SMME segment contribute approximately 60% of
employment in the economy and 40% of output. SMMEs are also seen as one of the few
ways by which the lowest-income people in South African society can gain access to
economic opportunities. As such, SMMEs are believed to play a significant role in the
South African economy, in terms of, employment creation, income generation and output
growth. Given the historic skewness of the distribution of income and wealth in South
Africa, it is believed investment in SMMEs, which are likely to create capacity for labour
absorption and output growth, can play a major role in correcting the income and wealth
imbalances.
The Government has, in the light of some of these findings, undertaken certain initiatives
to promote the SMME sector. These initiatives included the establishment of a Small
Business Centre under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry, the
establishment of the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency to provide non-financial
assistance, the establishment ofKhula Enterprise Finance Limited for the provision of
wholesale loans, Khula Credit Guarantee Limited for loan guarantees to Commercial
Banks, a pre-shipment export finance guarantee facility and the establishment ofthe
Competitive Fund for consultancy advice on technology and marketing. Whilst these
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initiatives have gone some way towards promoting and facilitating the formation of
SMMEs, the major problem, being SMME's lack of access to finance, still remained.
5.1. Lack of Access to Finance :
Research undertaken per the Draft Discussion Document (April 1998) found SMMEs
receive approximately 2.6% of investment capital flows, through formal and informal
agents, which is considered grossly inadequate for achieving the growth levels budgeted
for, in terms of the Government's macro-economic strategy. In particular, statistics from
the Council of South African Banks reflected Commercial Banks were not actively
utilising the Government's Khula indemnity scheme as a means of hedging their risk to this
sector.
The reasons suggested in mitigation of this result, by the Government sector was that the
structure of the formal banking sector in South Africa is such that most Banks concentrate
on gaining and retaining the more profitable corporate business. The financial services and
banking industry has few second tier financial institutions that act as intermediaries in
attracting savings and onlending these funds to SMMEs. Another reason suggested is
institutional investors (pension and insurance funds in particular) are risk averse and tend
to invest in more conservative and low to medium yielding investments. Unfortunately,
SMMEs do not fall into this category and are seen as being more high risk with volatile
returns. The financial sector has come under criticism for not cross subsidising from their
wealthy clients to SMMEs.
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Further, given the focus of the formal banking sector oftargeting larger, more profitable
corporate clients, most their products and services were found to cater for this market. the
result is that the formal banking sector offers a very small and limited product range to
SMMEs. Non-Government organisations (NGO's) attempted to fill this void in the
market, but have failed to reach a significant number ofthe SMME sector due to the
NGO's lack of infrastructure. Further, it was found that despite the Johannesburg
Securities Exchange (JSE) establishing the alternative investments market in the 1980's, it
has not been effective in providing access to capital for SMMEs.
Unfortunately the lack of provision of finance for SMMEs by the formal financial sector,
the paper found, often led to SMMEs having to resort to borrowing funds from alternative
financial intermediaries, in most instances, at exorbitant interest rates/finance charges and
sometimes illegally. Legislation has been passed in 2001 to regulate this industry . It
remains to be seen, however, whether these regulations have had a positive or negative
effect on the provision of finance to SMMEs.
Having highlighted, what has been identified by the authors of this Draft paper as the key
problem areas to access to finance by SMMEs, the authors go on to suggest four
objectives associated with access to affordable finance to SMMEs. These are listed below
'" to significantly increase the level of commercial and NGO lending and financial
services to SMMEs at interest rates not inflated by unreasonable risk perceptions;
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• to improve the outreach and efficiency ofboth conventional and alternative
financial institutions, especially in unserved rural areas;
• to stimulate the provision of start-up and small scale equity products for
SMMEs;
• to expand the number of SMEs listed on the JSE.
The paper concludes by suggesting a comprehensive and integrated policy framework and
implementation approach should go some way towards addressing these problems. The
draft discussion document goes further in trying to identify gaps in the supply of finance to
SMMEs.
It is suggested the formal financial sector, in the main commercial and merchant banks,
factoring companies and leasing institutions cater mostly for the small and medium (SME)
sized enterprises. Similarly, parastatals involved in retailing funds also focus on small and
medium sized enterprises. The result is that the survivalist and micro-enterprise sector are
largely ignored by the formal banking sector, thereby forcing the latter enterprises to seek
business finance from Non-Governmental Organisations and family. The authors of this
document found this to hold true for both debt and equity finance.
It is further recognised in this draft document, existing formal financial institutions face
high administrative costs and with the limited sophistication of entrepreneurs operating in
this market, most financial institutions are unlikely to be successful in serving the full
needs of the survivalist and micro-enterprise segment of the market. The challenge then
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remains for the formal financial sector to find innovative ways to serve this segment
profitably .
Recently, ABSA Bank, one of the big four banking institutions in South Africa, announced
it expected a decrease of at least 100 cents in it's share price following its earlier
announcement regarding the discovery of inadequate bad debt provisions at its mass
market lender UNIFER (The Star, Business Report, January 232002). However, the
report written by Jodie Ginsberg goes on to point out that despite ABSA Bank's
experience in this market, the formal financial sector is likely to remain optimistic about
doing business in this high risk- high return market. The reason espoused for this outlook
is the ABSA Bank experience was one of internal mismanagement as opposed to this
market segment being fraught with problems. The article quotes statistics from the Micro
Finance Regulatory Council which shows two million people use microloans, that is loans
ofunder RlOO 000, but estimates up to six million people might need access to this kind
of finance. The result, according to this article, is Government is putting ever-increasing
pressure on retail banks to make financial services available to this market. According to
Chris Stewart, Banking Analyst at Investee Asset Management : " There is money to be
made in this business if you manage it correctly."
In February 2002, Saambou Bank's (South Africa's seventh largest bank) long-term rating
was downgraded by Global Credit Ratings (GCR) from BBB+ to BBB and placed the
rating on rating watch. The rating agency justified the downgrading by saying although the
bank 's improved liquidity and capital adequacy mitigated short-term risks to an extent , the
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deterioration in its asset quality represented a significant risk facing the Group. Rating
Agency Fitch also placed Saambou on rating watch in December 2001 . The asset quality
issue focuses on the substantial bad debt provisions raised on Saambou' s microloan book.
The microloan book also increased the bank's cost ratio significantly, which weakened its
financial performance (Business Day, February 8 2002) . Less than a week later the bank
was placed under curatorship following a run on the bank. In one day depositors withdrew
approximately one billion rand, which led to the Bank having to close its doors and
freezing all accounts. It is uncertain at this point in time whether the downfall of Saambou
Bank is due to mismanagement or due wholly to the bad debts provisions in the microloan
/ lower income market. However, the answer thereto is academic now.
What the ABSNUnifer and Saambou incidents highlight is the lack of management ability
to manage the risk inherent in lending to the microloan and Small, Medium and micro
Enterprise Market. Further, it seems likely that other financial institutions will be more
cautious in their foray into this market. Unless the risk can be sufficiently hedged so as to
make doing business in this market profitable a more prudent and conservative approach is
likely to be followed .
6. OBSTACLES TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT
The draft discussion paper suggest the following key challenges, namely;
(i) encouraging formal financial institutions to make finance and financial services more
generally available to larger micro and to very small enterprises;
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(ii) encouraging the growth of alternative financial institutions providing finance to
survivalist and micro enterprises, especially in informal settlements and rural areas, and;
(iii) encouraging a greater availability of equity finance for smaller firms.
It is suggested these challenges be overcome by (iJ increasing the perceivedprofitability
ofSlvUvfE investments and Oil improving the structure, regulatory framework and
financing terms ofthe financial system. (Italics inserted).
To elaborate on the above points, it is recognised that the profitability of any investment
hinges on the costs of making the investment and the return received thereon. In the case
of lending to the SMME and low income / mass market, the costs one would encounter is
likely to include - overhead and administrative costs, cost of capital and the cost of
default. However, it is countered these costs will not pose a problem provided pricing
allows for cost-recovery and risk. The formal financial sector has often argued that the
investment in SMMEs is more labour intensive thereby making the costs of servicing this
market segment more costly / less profitable. With this in mind and when considering the
local financial services sector, in particular, the Big four Banks operate inefficiently with
cost to income ratios averaging in excess of 60% (compared to their overseas counterparts
who have cost to income ratios of approximately 50%), it is unlikely the formal financial
services sector will push vigorously to make significant inroads into this market given the
existing perceived costs and returns
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Further, it has been found the screening mechanism employed by Banks, for example,
credit checks, business plans and collateral requirements result in loan applications being
rejected as these factors commonly apply adversely to the previously disadvantaged
entrepreneurs and the mass market. We define "previously disadvantaged" as anyone who
previously did not have full/unrestricted access to all spheres of the economy, social and
political fronts due to previous Government policies and legislation. That is, in many
instances, these previously disadvantaged entrepreneurs have adverse credit records,
produce poorly drawn up business plans and do not have acceptable collateral to offer the
banks. On the flip side, it has been argued the formal financial sector does not fully
understand the principle involved in lending to SMMEs and how to assess the level of risk
appropriately, with the result loan applications are rejected.
Alternative financial institutions, in particular, microlending enterprises have been
extremely successful in South Africa . However, it has been found that sustainability of
these enterprises is a problem due to their inability to expand significantly without running
into bad debt problems. The result has been a number of new microlending enterprises,
which tend to however be small and localised. Some of these microlending enterprises
tend to charge exorbitant interest rates as they were previously unregulated. However,
Barbara Hogan, Chairman ofParliament's finance portfolio committee, is drawing up draft
legislation aimed at regulating financial service providers which she believes should extend
to microlending enterprises (The Star, Business Report, January 232002). Ms Hogan
believes that by excluding microlenders from the ambit of the Financial Advisory and
Intermediary Services Bill (FAIS) could allow certain brokers to act recklessly.
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Another alternative potential source of funding is equity funding raised on the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. The Exchange has the Development Capital Market
(DCM) and the Venture Capital Market (VCM), on which smaller enterprises may raise
equity. However, it has been found by the authors of the Draft Discussion Paper (April
1998) the activity level on these markets has been low. The reasons proffered for this is
that investors perceive the risk attached to this sector to be unmanageable, with these
enterprises generally having low turnover and price-equity ratios . Furthermore credible
directors are not prepared to risk their reputations and sit on the boards ofDCM/VCM
enterprises. It has been noted , however, that marketing of small businesses on NASDAQ
and the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange has attracted
attention from both investors and companies. The paper suggests perhaps a set of
incentives and social responsibility guidelines may need to be introduced to encourage
both brokers and investors to become involved in alternative markets.
We turn now to discuss whether the objectives ofBank's Act and the Mutual Bank's Act.
Acts as an obstacle to providing finance to the SMME market segment.
6.1 The Bank's Act and the Mutual Banks Act:
The draft document (April 1998) suggests in successful financial markets, regulations play
four critical roles, namely, maintaining safety and soundness, promoting competition,
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protecting consumers and ensuring underserved groups have some access to capital.
Further, it is stated that the goals of economic well being and social objectives need not be
contrary to each other. The American examples, in respect of the social objectives of the
Community Reinvestment Act, Small Business Administration and Federal National
Mortgage Association were found to re-enforce economic objectives . It would appear
these Acts, if interpreted and used in the spirit in which they were drawn-up does not act
as a stumbling block to accessing finance to the SMME market segment. Some parties
have suggested we look at our country's past policies in order to ascertain reasons for the
lack of access to finance for the SMME market segment.
7. Lack of Vital skills due to the past :
The Business Day, January 10 2002 published an interesting article under the heading
Black Business needs state support. The article notes a World Bank Survey by Vandana
Chandra, Jean Pascal-Nganou and Claire-Marie Noel entitled "Constraints to black
empowerment at grass roots level and informal sector growth" which espouses the
absence of collateral , credit records and business skills is not a sign of natural poverty
among black owners of informal businesses but is the result of past discriminatory policies.
One of the suggestions Chandra made, in terms ofthe article, is that policy makers need to
support skills training for managing credit, thereby removing the perception that black
people are unable to run a profitable business. This support, it is suggested needs to
extend beyond assistance merely for new informal black firms but should be extended to
those black firms who have already gotten off the ground. Other areas for Government
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which the survey identified as being crucial was the restoration of safety and security,
improving infrastructure and facilitating training.
The improvement of the business trading environment, sound support infrastructure and
competent management gained through sound training will no doubt go some way to
reducing what Bank's perceive as the business (environmental and management) risk ofa
business. The result is likely to lead to more favourable assessment of credit applications
by Financial Institutions.
In the next sub-section we examine who are the likely participants in providing fianace to
the SM:ME market segment. We also look at potential local market players in the credit
derivatives market.
8. Possible Market / Investor Participants:
The Institute for SME Finance actively promotes finance or capital for the emerging
industry of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing and transitional
economies. Presently, the Institute defines SMEs as companies with an annual turnover of
between $100 000 and $5 000000. The companies are usually growth oriented
entrepreneurs who lack access to non-asset based finance and require financial assistance
from outside stakeholders to help their grow their businesses.
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The Institute was launched in July 2000 after having been successfully piloted in Miami in
the United States of America . The articles notes that in recent years the Institute has
become more aware of the potential of the SME Market, especially in underserved
markets and low-income areas throughout the world. Whether South Africa has been
identified as falling into this category and as being a potential foreign direct investment
destination by the Institute remains to be seen. However, we draw the readers attention to
the potential such an Institute can serve by pooling together investors who can participate
as the buyer of the credit default risk under a credit derivative. In such a scenario, local
South African Banks of International standing can administer and source the credit
application and sell the risk via the use of a credit derivative instrument in the market. The
market can be potentially made-up of investors brought together by the Institute.
In an article entitled New Asset Classes (Credit Derivatives 2001 - Issues and
Opportunities by Citigroup), it is noted that as the credit derivatives market evolves, it
tends to revolve increasingly around "small subsets of regularly traded names" . Hence in
order to diversify the credit exposure, investors have been forced to look to other, less
liquid investment opportunities. It was found that portfolio transactions that reference a
bank 's commercial or industrial loan portfolio have been one outlet for this risk taking
capacity. Also due to bank 's regulatory capital requirements, portfolio transactions were
found to focus mainly on the investment-grade sector. This has in some instances been
expanded to include obligors whose ratings have been linked to rating agencies ' scoring
systems. These obligors are not generally traded in the single-name market and thus
provide a certain degree of diversification. However, liquidity in obligors whose ratings
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have been mapped or linked to rating agencies is much tighter. In the light of these
findings, it will be interesting to reflect on whether these obligors will have the appetite to
provide risk protection for an SMME portfolio of one of the "big four" South African
Banks. Based on the sound ratings of these Banks it seems likely obligors will strongly
consider contracting with them, as protection sellers, in credit derivative transactions..
In the next section we examine Credit derivatives in greater detail.
SECTION C : WHAT ARE CREDIT DERIVATIVES ALL ABOUT?
In this section we commence by asking the question why hedge at all, that is, is it a zero-
sum game or do shareholders benefit. We then take a look at how credit risk is generally
managed at present, where after we launch into a more in-depth examination of credit
derivatives and some applications of credit derivative instruments.
9. Why hedge at All ?
Hedging involves the minimising of risk. The question posed by Joseph Neu in a article
entitled "Why hedge at all ?" is pertinent, in particular, from a shareholder viewpoint. That
is, many academic arguments espouse that hedging, for example with the use of credit
derivative instruments, is a zero sum game. Increasingly, the Treasury Departments are
being requested to justify the costslbenefits ofhedging and whether hedging is adding to
shareholder value. Neu suggests that most hedgers realise that in the long run, hedging
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may not lead to sustainable positive gains, but most hedgers realise that they are buying
time with their hedges that will help in the shorter run. That is, waiting for zero sum
equalisation could transcend a career or even the life of a firm. As a result of this type of
thinking, it is becoming more important for treasurers to justify the benefits ofhedging .
In the case ofcredit risk, the benefits can be best understood by looking at the
components of credit risk. The actual credit spread is a combination of four factors,
namely, particular company risk, sector spread, maturity of debt and supply and demand
forces . This means that unless a Bank, for example buys the most tailored credit
derivative, any hedge instrument will only protect a portion of the total credit exposure
and leave the hedger with some residual basis risk. The treasurer will argue an 80 or 90
percent risk is still better than no hedge. And as new hedge products emerge, such as the
various credit derivative instruments, the ability to match exposure with hedge will
improve dramatically. Hence, the benefit to shareholders is hedging, by using credit
derivatives insures against default or bad debts, which can lead to the loss on an
investment as in the case of investors in Unifer and Saambou. The job of the Treasurer,
however, is to ensure the cost of insuring against this risk does not outweigh the benefit. If
this is properly managed, shareholder value will be enhanced .
In the ensuing sub-section we look at how credit risk is generally managed by banks
10. Managing Credit Risks
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In an article (Managing Credit Risks May 23.2001 , Wee Cheow and Chua Kim Chiu), the
authors note the management of credit risk is central to the success of any bank. As such,
by allowing banks and other financial institutions to transfer credit risk from one party to
another, credit derivatives have helped to enhance the efficiency and flexibility of credit
risk management in these institutions. Credit derivatives now also allow these banks and
other financial institutions to isolate and separate credit risk from the intrinsic influences of
the underlying lending relationship. In so doing, participants can now view credit as a
tradable commodity thereby allowing for increased focus on active credit portfolio
management.
These authors believe credit derivatives have the potential to transform the fundamental
lending model of many commercial banks. They go on to suggest the operating model for
the Commercial bank 's lending product will require re-assessing, which may extend to re-
looking at how loans should be made, how services should be developed, priced and
targeted, how risks should be assessed, priced and selected and how risk-oriented
processes should be developed and implemented.
It is noted Banks involved in the commercial lending market have traditionally sought to
contain all aspects of the lending process from origination to monitoring / administration
within their operations. Hence once the risk has been accepted it would remain with the
bank or financial institution until maturity. With the advent of credit derivatives the
opportunity now presents itself where origination of a loan is undertaken with a view to
possible ultimate distribution. This distribution could take the form ofsecuritisation (
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where the actual asset is disposed off) or by insuring against the credit risk ( by way ofa
credit derivative).
These authors go on to suggest Credit Managers need no longer view a credit decision as
simply binary, that is, accept or decline, but can use the originate manage and distribute
(OMD) model. In this instance the financial institution will never have to make an outright
rejection for any loan application provided it remains economically possible to layoffthe
risk to the market. The credit management function then assumes the role ofmanaging
portfolio risks ofthe institution, taking decisions at the margin for new transactions and
changing the portfolio by way of secondary market sales, securitisation and credit
derivative activities as necessary .
11. Credit Derivatives: new methods for risk management:
Natasha Beck (Credit Derivatives : new methods for risk management:
Australian CPA March 2000), notes in global financial markets, credit derivatives have
been trumpeted as revolutionary new products that enable, in particular, financial
institutions, to manage selected credit risks separately from other types of financial risk,
such as interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk. It is noted that financial institutions
have used credit derivatives largely to hedge loans to guard against deterioration in the
value of their investment portfolios, thus far. Beck reasons that the appeal of credit
derivatives may be found in the fact that financial institutions restricted by internal
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borrowing limits constrained by industry/geographylborrower can extend further credit to
a particular borrower because the additional credit exposure beyond the normal credit
limit is covered by the credit derivatives. Credit Derivatives may also be used by a Bank to
restructure its concentration ofcredit risk between industries ofgeographic regions .
11.1. Risk Transfer :
The management of credit risk through credit derivatives is achieved by transferring credit
risks to other parties that provide for payments to be received in the event of default or
specific losses incurred. In many cases, there are two parties to the transaction, namely the
protection buyer - the party who wishes to hedge against the credit risk and the protection
seller - the party receiving a premium and in return undertakes to pay the protection buyer
a specified amount should a specified credit event occur.
We examine four basic types of credit derivative structure, namely, total return swaps,
credit default swaps, credit spread options and credit linked notes.
a) Total Return Swaps:
Total return swaps are the mostly used form ofcredit derivative according to Beck. They
can be used by Banks to expand their loan book beyond their normal lending limits or by
organisations that want to hold an asset to maturity but are not comfortable with the
asset's credit exposure. A total return swap enables the holder to hedge the credit risk of
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the loan/asset whilst retaining ownership. Reasons for maintaining ownership may include
regulatory requirements of perhaps the desire to maintain a relationship with the borrower.
In other words, a total return swap can provide cover for a partial or total loss in capital
value of a specific asset, such as a loan or a bond.
The protection buyer undertakes to pay the protection seller for each defined period the
amount of any interest received on the asset together with capital appreciation. In return
the protection seller commits to pay a floating interest rate (usually based on a spread on
an index such as LIBOR or JIBAR) plus any capital depreciation. Thus the protection
buyer recovers any loss in value from the counter party.
The counter-party to the credit derivative could be an investor, that will use total return
swaps to take on credit exposure to an industry/ market/country by entering into a
transaction as the protection seller, on the basis ofa belief of superior knowledge of
experience in that market or merely as an investment which offsets the risk of other
investments in the overall portfolio of investments. While a total return swap can provide
insurance against loss on a specific credit / basket of credits, the relatively high cost of
establishing the structure means it is often only worthwhile for covering credits of
significant value.
b) Credit Default Swaps :
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This structure is considered as the simplest type of credit derivative . They provide the
right to receive payment in the event an agreed default occurs. They are not specifically
related to the credit rating of the borrower or the asset being hedged . Their uses are
similar to those of credit return swaps. As distinct from credit return swaps, only the
downside risk is included in the financial evaluation and the protection buyer preserves
the right to benefit from any increase in value. Credit default swaps are contracts in
which the protection buyer can hedge the default risk of a counterparty/ basket of
counterparties in return for the payment of a fee. A payment by the protection seller is
prompted by the occurrence of a credit event, which must have been previously stated in
reference to the underlying asset.
The contract terminates when a specified credit event or default of a payment occurs.
Although the transaction is usually concluded by cash payment of the amount of the loss,
physical settlement is also possible, where the protection seller pays the protection buyer
the full notional amount of the default payment and takes delivery of the bond.
c) Credit Spread Options:
A call/put option is the right but not the obligation to buy/sell. As such a credit spread
option is an option on a specified borrower's credit's credit spread. Credit spread options
could be appropriate where an investor believes a corporate's credit rating may change,
thereby affecting it's credit spread over the base bank rate, which in turn will affect the
30
principal value of the debt instrument. The investor then buys a credit-spread call to
leverage from the credit upgrade/downgrade should it occur.
The option buyer pays a premium, which is either paid as a lump sum or is amortised over
the term ofthe option. In turn, the option seller agrees to make a lump sum payment if a
particular borrower's credit spread moves over a stated threshold.
d) Credit-linked Notes:
Credit linked notes were popular in international markets in the early 1990's. However,
since then credit swaps and option instruments have largely replaced it.
The credit-linked note is an on-balance sheet note representing a synthetic corporate bond
or loan with an embedded credit derivative in it. They are often issued by special purpose
vehicles, and represent a way for institutional investors to participate in the corporate bank
loan market. There are many different structures for credit linked notes. They apply where
an investor invests in a special purpose vehicle that has been created to handle a financial
transaction of a banklbroker with a third entity. The bank guarantees the performance of
the special purpose vehicle that derives money from its investment. The direct credit risk
lies with the special purpose vehicle but in reality is guaranteed by the bank.
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Apart from the standard variations of credit derivative instruments mentioned above, it is
now recognised that credit derivative instruments can be applied in more exotic ways. We
encounter this in the next sub-section.
12. Credit Derivatives move beyond Plain Vanilla
Aggrawal (http://edgar.stern.nyu.edu/~sjournal/articles_OD/ere) defines credit derivatives
as privately negotiated bilateral contracts, which allows users to manage their exposure to
credit risk. The example he uses id that ofa bank concerned that one of it's customers
may not be able to repay a loan can protect itself against loss by transferring the credit risk
to another party whilst keeping the loan on its book. This mechanism can be used for any
instrument or basket of instruments provided an objective default price can be determined.
In this way, the buyers and sellers of the credit risk can achieve numerous objectives, for
example, concentration ofrisk in a portfolio can be reduced, the seller can have access to
the portfolio without actually making the loan, etc .. Thus credit derivatives offer a flexible
way ofmanaging credit risk and present opportunities to enhance yields by purchasing
credit synthetics.
Aggrawal goes on to define credit risk as the possibility that a borrower will fail to service
or repay a debt on time. The degree ofrisk is reflected in the borrower's credit rating,
which can be seen as the premium over the risk-free rate.
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The market for credit derivatives is believed to be growing in leaps and bounds. According
to Aggrawal the market oftotal credit derivatives outstanding is estimated at $75 billion.
Further, whilst traditionally credit derivatives were confined to use by banks, they are
being used increasing by Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and corporate
treasurers. Aggrawal notes that existing derivative techniques have been usedfor
emerging market debt and have been applied to corporate bonds and syndicated bank
loans. Hence these structures present investors with opportunities to diversify their
portfolios and improve their yields by investing in areas that were previously not opened
to them. It is believed credit derivatives will make credit risk pricing more efficient and
help segregate credit risk from Market risk. That is, institutions best suited to manage a
specific type of risk component will be in a position to buy only that portion of risk and
warehouse/ package it.
13. Repackaging using Credit Derivative :
Bearing in mind the objective of this study is to explore to what extent credit derivatives
can be used effectively to hedge the risk oflending to the SMME Market, we consider in
this section whether repackaging using credit derivatives is perhaps a strong possibility of
achieving this objective. When considering credit derivatives have thus far been used
largely to hedge corporate and to some extent sovereign risk, we need to investigate
whether the risk associated with lending to the SMME Market can be hedged effectively
with the use of credit derivative instruments.
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Repackaging, in this context, can be defined as the use of derivatives to take one risk
profile and change it to another more satisfactory risk profile. The credit derivative market
is viewed as having three main categories, namely,
- single name products, such as, default swaps, asset swaps and total rate of return swaps.
- the portfolio complex, such as, collaterised debt obligations (CDOs), synthetic CDOs,
balance sheet synthetics and pure arbitrage CDOs
- the repackaging business, such as, credit linked notes and repackaged swaps .
If repackaging is viewed merely as risk management problem solving then all three of
these categories have a role to play. It is often noted that in a vast majority of cases, the
credit risk that requires repackaging is a risk the company has to take in order to do
business . A credit default swap is a bilateral financial contract in which the protection
buyer pays a periodic fee in return for a contingent payment by the protection seller
following a credit event. In this instance the repackaging potential is quite obvious. For
example, if Company X is dependent on a debt repayment stream from Company Y, in
order to itself make payments to Company Z, then by Company X taking out a credit
default swap with a Bank, it can cover the risk of Company Y defaulting on its
repayments. Company X will pay the bank a regular fee in the knowledge that should a
credit event be triggered, the bank will make payment.
The above is probably the most basic way in which a credit risk can be repackaged. One of
the most exciting opportunities presented by credit derivatives is that they are extremely
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flexible and can be structured to transform any credit risk or portion of credit risk. For
example, a contingent credit swap could be used. In this instance, an additional trigger or
event apart from the credit event is required.
The next section deals with the future potential of the credit derivatives market. That is,
are credit derivatives merely a fad that will be short-lived or is it a growing market, which
is likely to define the way we manage risk in the future? After all ifit is seen as a short-
term phenomenon, then it is unlikely to be a potential long-term solution to hedging the
credit risk inherent in the SMME market segment.
SECTION D : THE FUTURE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES
14. Credit Derivatives - Five Years Out
In this section, we examine the responses of several prominent people in the derivatives
field when asked to predict what can be expected, in respect of, credit derivatives in the
next five years :1998 - 2002 . In particular, the following questions were posed in an article
(Credit Derivatives Five Years Out,
http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archiveI1997/0797rtbl.asp), namely, how
will banks manage the credit risk oftheir loan portfolios ? How will the products change
the way institutional investors invest in the bond market? How will international
regulators view the capital adequacy ofbanks? What effects will they have on other areas
of the financial world ?
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Blythe Masters, head of credit derivatives, at JP Morgan was one of the derivative
specialists interviewed in the 1997 survey. In Blythe's view credit derivatives are expected
to fundamentally change the way bank's price, manage, transact, originate and distribute
their credit risk. He noted that presently global credit markets display discrepancies in the
pricing of the same credit risk for different classes of assets, maturities, rating cohorts,
time zones, currencies and so on. The discrepancies appear to have persisted because
arbitrageurs have traditionally been unable to purchase obligations against shorting
expensive ones in order to extract arbitrage profits. However, it is expected that as
derivatives gain in popularity and liquidity improves, banks, borrowers and other credit
players will exploit such opportunities similar to the experience regarding interest rate
derivatives in the 1980's. The natural consequence of this is that credit-pricing
discrepancies gradually disappear as credit markets become more efficient.
Blythe goes on to predict that banks will also adopt a more proactive approach to trading
and managing credit exposure, which should see a corresponding decline in the holding
period for loans. It is likely that banks will shed the exposure ofborrowers with whom
they have no meaningful relationships. Such transaction Blythe expects will occur both on
a one-offbasis and increasingly by way ofbilateral portfolio swaps, which in a sense is a
more effective way of ensuring a more suitably diversified portfolio.
Blythe goes on to suggest banks will increasingly have the ability to choose whether to act
as passive lenders or as pro active return-on-equity driven originators ofloans, traders,
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servicers and distributors ofloan products. The result from this is likely to be greater
transaction frequency and the availability of up-to-date pricing, which is likely to lead
toward the marking to market ofloan portfolios. Credit derivatives will also bring about
greater efficiency in pricing and greater liquidity. As such financial institutions,
institutional investors and some corporates are likely to benefit from this.
Blythe envisages that just as the rapidly growing securitisation market is bringing investors
of credit assets, the credit derivatives market will strip out and repackage credit
exposures, which exposures would otherwise not naturally lend themselves to
securitisation.
David Crammond, President of Intercapital predicted a greater "warehousing" of risk and
increased re-distribution networks for credit products. The use of, what Crammond terms
credit baskets through derivative packages will allow for microsyndication of credit
exposures in the secondary markets. This will likely see risk management become further
centralised and market price orientated. As such, institutional investors will have a
completely broken out credit and will be in a position to trade and manage it actively
through derivatives as they would trade and manage currency risks.
Crammond rightly in my opinions believes international regulators will have a challenging
task as a result of the migration of credit risk and credit liquidity from banks . This aspect
will be discussed in greater detail when we consider the recommendations of the Basel
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Committee. In particular, the control of systemic risk is likely to become more difficult and
will require a greater deal of co-operation between banks and regulators globally.
Crammond also envisages there will be more insurers who will become active in this
market. After all credit derivatives is making inroads into the "premium" business area of
credit enhancement.
Joyce Frost, Vice President - Credit Derivatives, Chase seems to think the credit
derivatives market will continue to grow exponentially provided there is a knowledgeable
user base, an accommodating regulatory environment and sufficient liquidity in the market
place. She likens the growth in the derivative market to the rapid growth in the interest
and currency derivatives markets in the 1980's. She goes on to predict, however, the
growth in the credit derivatives market is likely to be quicker than the latter due to the
widespread familiarity with derivative products in general and the downturn in the credit
cycle that will make risk management more important.
Frost predicts the largest users of credit derivatives by 2002 will be commercial banks,
who will use the products primarily for risk management purposes. She goes on to suggest
as credit derivatives gain in popularity we are likely to witness regional and industry-
related credit indices to enable the more effective management of exposures on a portfolio
basis. Frost also expects to see credit derivatives becoming a hit with insurance
companies, investment banks, mutual and pension funds and corporates.
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In essence, Frost is of the opinion the increased use of credit derivatives will add more
efficiency and liquidity to the market place, reallocating credit exposures more optimally
to those investors best experienced to manage them. This is expected to lead to a
fundamental decline in system-wide risk as credit derivatives continue to breach barriers to
investment and risk management, thereby broadening the investor base for credit exposure
and further empowering users to manage exposures more efficiently, credit spreads are
likely to decline or narrow.
Shaun Rai, Acting Head of Credit Derivatives - crnc Wood Gundy speaking on behalf of
his firm estimates the credit derivative market will grow from an estimated $150 billion
total notional outstanding in 1997 to more than $1 trillion by 2002 . The reasons they
espouse for this expected growth in the credit derivatives market is that firstly the
aggregate market for credit risk is believed to be large . This then provides broad scope for
the application of credit derivatives. Secondly the market is still highly segmented by
geography, product and term which provides extensive opportunity for the use of credit
derivatives to extract value from pricing differences, credit perceptions to risk aversion
among different types of investors. Thirdly, crnc notes that financial institutions are
focusing more resources on developing sophisticated management tools that will enable
them to identify risks and opportunities resident in their portfolios.
Credit derivatives, it is expected, will be used extensively to respond efficiently to these
new opportunities. In particular, Rai believes the resulting enhanced portfolio analysis
arising from the use of this sophisticated management tools will reveal an under-
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diversification in many institutions. As a result there will be an increased desire by these
financial institutions to diversify their portfolios and this will create an opportunity to use
credit derivative transactions to improve their diversification.
The result, as also predicted by Blythe, will be increased efficiency in this market, reduced
cost of credit to borrowers globally and credit risk will be migrated to the best , most
experienced manager of that particular exposure.
Kaufman, Head Global credit derivatives at BankBoston, seems to concur with the views
already expressed above. That is, the greater use of credit derivatives will likely lead to
improved liquidity in the market, pricing and efficiency will also improve as will
information systems and tools to provide management with more accurate and timely risk
profiles . Kaufman goes on to add that it is likely that regulators will shift the capital
framework to an internal model application (that is, a model developed specifically for a
particular financial institution/segment as opposed to a generic model implemented by the
regulator) that quantifies credit risk more precisely and recognises the benefits of
diversification .
In the next sub-section we examine some potential obstacles to growth of the credit
derivatives market.
15. Obstacles to Growth in the Credit Derivatives Market:
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The following factors have been identified as factors or obstacles to growth of the credit
derivative market :
lack of effective infrastructure, lack ofliquidity and the lack of transparency.
a) Lack of Infrastructure :
Cheow and Chiu are of the opinion banks need to develop a more sophisticates and
integrated infrastructure capable of responding to the expanding volumes and increasing
complexity of credit products. The failure to do so, it is mooted could impair growth and
heighten operational risks within the financial institution. Existing configurations generally
fail to provide an overview of portfolio data at a level sufficient for the effective portfolio
management. Further these configurations also lack the systems capabilities to interface.
Hence it is suggested banks need an integrated business generation model capable of
providing end-to-end support for the new credit model.
b) Lack ofLiquidity :
It is noted that whilst the credit derivative market is relatively liquid, the lack of
standardised credit derivative contracts and definitions has acted as a stumbling block in
dealing with these instruments. Further the lack of common information technology
platforms for trading and settlement purposes has also contributed to the lack of access to
the market thereby leading to less liquidity. Moves to standardise the derivatives contracts
and definitions contained therein together with a common IT Platform for trading and
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settlement is likely to lift the present restrictions on trade and also improve liquidity in the
derivative market.
c) Lack of Transparency :
Due to the issues surrounding the lack of liquidity in the credit derivatives market, namely
the absence of a suitable IT Platform, this also leads to inadequate data and hence a
general lack of transparency. Further due to the definitions in different countries being
non-standardised, it becomes difficult to collect and collate objective data. JP Morgan has
introduced an online credit derivative trading platform (morgancredit.com / ORBIT),
whence the prices are available during trading hours in the US, Europe and the Asian -
Pacific countries. The site also provides data for individual credits and credits sorted by
geographic and industry sectors.
We turn our attention next to examine some current issues pertaining to credit risk and the
management thereof
16. Current Issues:
16.1. The Allocation of Risk and Liquidity in capital markets: Market Makers and
Arbitrageurs
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Saito's paper (The Allocation ofRisk and Liquidity in capital markets: Market Makers and
Arbitrageurs) focuses on the consequences of recent developments of financial technology
and explores policy implications for the proper operation of capital markets. In particular,
this paper attempts to highlight the interaction between risk allocation in capital markets
and the liquidity allocation in money markets.
Saito suggests that jointly with the action of noise traders, the behaviour of investors
armed with advanced financial technology sometimes yields a drastic decrease in asset
prices, and causes the liquidity crisis in asset markets. The example, he cites is that of a
simultaneous trigger of a dynamic hedging strategy and the active over-the-counter
trading of sophisticated financial derivatives. Market makers and arbitrageurs to which
liquidity is not immediately available, will not be in a position to set asset prices properly.
As a result asset prices may remain far below fundamentals for a long time . On the other
hand, commercial banks may loan money to arbitrageurs without properly evaluating the
arbitrageur's position fully, and hence make excess liquidity provision for them.
Arbitrageurs with too much liquidity, Saito notes are likely to take more risky positions.
Should asset prices move against their positions, and the potential risk they have taken is
realised, arbitrageurs may be forced to liquidate their positions. Such action may lead to
speedy sales of assets, which will increase supply of the assets leading to a drop in the
asset price well below fundamentals.
He goes on to suggest that given this likelihood, the proper formation ofassets prices
require the proper allocation ofliquidity to both market-makers and arbitrageurs. That is,
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the smooth functioning of money markets basically backs the effective functioning of
capital markets. The close link between money-markets and capital markets suggests,
according to Saito, that monetary authorities and central banks are indirectly yet
importantly responsible for the order of capital markets due to their significant impact on
money markets. It is noted monetary authorities monitor bank loan activities such that
banks may not make excess provision of liquidity to arbitrageurs, while central banks
provide liquidity promptly in the case of a liquidity crunch. Saito concludes that a
combination ofthe above measures is a pre-condition for the operation of a modem
capital market.
16.2. Credit Risk Management
Toshifumi (IBJ-DL Technology Co . Ltd) views one of the principle roles of financial
institutions as being that of taking financial risk of others through financial contracts.
Hence, he concludes financial risk management is one ofthe crucial issues financial
institutions need to concentrate on as part of the management of their business.
As regulatory authorities proceed with financial deregulation, banks are required to brush
up their risk management systems . It is noted in such situations, many banks are trying to
improve their methods and formations of the credit risk management to get up-to-date
with the changes in circumstances of the banking industry.
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The new framework of credit risk management based on quantitative methods, which we
will discuss in greater detail in Section E, according to Toshifumi calls for the following
assumptions, namely, the occurrence of default of the counterparty is a probabilistic event
and secondly the default losses should be analysed statistically as the total credit portfolio.
In this paper, Toshifumi introduces us to what he terms "a risk measurement method" and
" a series of risk control methods" as the quantitative tools for the credit risk management.
According to Toshifumi the first step of quantitative credit risk measurement is to
calculate the expectation of the default of loss of the credit portfolio. The elements of the
calculation we are advised are the default probabilities for each credit grades of the
counterparty, the credit exposure and the rate of recovery from collateral for each credit
contract. The second step, Toshifumi suggests is to calculate the possible excess loss over
the expected loss (italics mine) due to not well diversified credit portfolios within a certain
confidence limit. The third step is then to calculate the potential shift of the expected loss
due to movement ofthe elements of the expectation calculation within certain confidence
limits. He goes on to suggest three possibilities for this shift, namely,(I) due to the
movement of the default probabilities, (2) due to the movement of the credit exposure and
(3) due to the movement ofthe recovery rate. These steps of credit risk measurement can
be harmonised with the market risk measurement, Value at Risk (VAR) calculation, and is
intended to go toward the total risk management.
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Toshifumi goes on to espouse there are two categories for credit risk control methods.
One category is those methods to protect us from exceeding the previous level of credit
risk and the other is those to refine the risk structure afterwards.
The risk protection methods include (1) pricing guidelines so as to keep enough expected
revenue, (2) exposure limits for each counterparty to keep the diversification effect within
certain level, and (3) exposure limits for each industry block or regional blocks to keep the
default probability movement effect within a certain level.
The risk structure refinement methods include (1) risk elimination methods using asset
liquidation or asset securitisation, and (2) risk hedging method using credit derivatives.
Toshifumi notes there are many issues to be addressed for such quantitative methods to be
deeply used in daily risk management activities of the financial institutions. These issues
are
(1) the mark-to-market measurement for credit risk, (2) storage of the historical default
data and refinement of the parameter estimation methods, (3) refinement of the credit
rating system with refinement of the rating method and improvement of the disclosure of
the financial data,
(4) growth of the secondary market of credit and (5) improvement of the Basle regulation.
We examine the regulatory issues concerning credit derivatives below.
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SECTION E : REGULATORY ISSUES CONCERNING CREDIT DERIVATIVES
17. Evolutionary Changes in Banking and Bank Regulations
The focus of a paper (Evolutionary Changes in Banking and Bank Regulations
(Kazuhito Ikeo, Keio University and Takahiro Nagata, Dai-ichi Life Research Institute) is
that ofbanking business and bank regulations. According to these authors the fundamental
driving force was a change in the overall banking environment, which can be divided into
the following areas :
(1) economic conditions,
(2) technical basis, and
(3) corporate governance. Banks adjusted their action in response to the environmental
changes. For example, it is noted in the United States, the change in the banking business
affected not only the development of highly sophisticated risk management systems but
also the scope of banking business. As a result ofthese changes, supervising authorities
were forced to revise the framework of bank regulations.
These authors note that in fact the United States Federal Regulatory Agencies and the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) changed not only regulations but also their
attitude towards the regulation of the banking business . This led to Banks not simply
accepting the new regulations and attitude but themselves became proactively involved in
influencing the formulation of new legislation .
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18. New Regulatory Capital Framework:
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
18.1 Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issues a framework for evaluating the
internal control systems as part of its ongoing efforts to enhance supervision through
guidance and sound risk management practices. Effective internal controls are believed to
be a critical aspect ofbank management and a foundation for the safe and responsible
operation of banking organisations. It is thought an effective and efficient system of
internal control is likely to ensure banking organisations achieve their goals and objectives,
log-term profitability targets a re met and reliable financial and managerial reporting is
maintained. Such a system of internal control will also assist banks comply with laws and
regulations, policies and rules as well as decrease the risk of unexpected losses and
thereby tarnish a bank's image. In what follows we discuss the recommendations of the
Basle Committee, who have drawn a wealth of information from member countries, to
outline a number of principles for use by supervisory authorities when evaluating a bank's
internal control systems. This can be particularly relevant to the South African Reserve
48
Bank, who may have much to gain from these experiences, when considering South
African Banks are still relatively new players in the international banking arena. Further,
the increasing popularity of more sophisticated hedging instruments, such as credit
derivatives, are likely to necessitate a re-look at capital adequacy requirements and
internal control systems in place.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has been prompted in part as a result of the
significant losses incurred by several international banks. Their analysis of the problems
related to these losses indicate these losses could have been avoided had the banks
maintained effective internal control systems. It is thought such systems would have
prevented or enables the earlier detection ofthe problems that led to the losses, thereby
limiting damage to the banking organisation. The principles recommended by the
Committee are intended for general application and it is suggested supervisory authorities
should use them in assessing their own supervisory methods and procedures for
monitoring how banks structure their internal monitoring systems. The Committee goes on
to suggest that banking supervisors use the principles recommended by them in evaluating
internal control over all on and offbalance sheet activities ofbanks and consolidated
banking organisations.
The ensuing paragraphs contain a discussion of the recommendations of the Committee,
specifically in respect of, operational risk management, enhancing bank transparency,
sound practices for loan accounting, credit risk, disclosure and related matters, Bank's
interaction with highly leveraged institutions and the new Basle capital accord.
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The Basle Committee noted that managing operational risk is becoming an important
feature of responsible risk management practice in modem financial markets. The most
important types of operational risk involve breakdown in internal controls and corporate
governance. It is noted such breakdowns can lead to financial losses through error, fraud,
or failure to act timeously and bank officials acting outside oftheir mandates in either an
unethical or risky manner. Other aspects ofoperational risk include major failure of
information technology systems . These aspects are of particular significance in the
derivatives markets, where cross border transactions are common place and electronic
trading platforms are used. The Basle Committee interviewed representatives from thirty
major banks from different member countries and the following common themes emerged
18.1.1. Enhancing Bank Transparency
The Committee presupposes that markets contain disciplinary mechanisms that can
reinforce the efforts of supervisors by rewarding banks that manage risk effectively and
penalise banks that manage their risk in an inept and imprudent manner. It is, however,
noted market discipline can only work if market participants have access to timeous and
reliable information thereby enabling them to assess a their activities and risks inherent in
those activities . Improved public disclosure is thought to strengthen the market
participant's ability to encourage safe and sound banking practices. Prudent banking
supervision coupled with market discipline, the Committee considers is critical to
promoting long-term stability ofboth individual institutions and the banking systems. The
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effectiveness of this interaction it is felt is dependent on public disclosure. The document
goes on to recommend that supervisors focus their efforts on encouraging high-quality
public disclosure at a reasonable cost. Supervisors can be pro-active in this regard by
enhancing comparability by promoting the use of supervisory definitions and reporting
classifications in public disclosure. Supervisors are also encouraged to promote the
compliance with disclosure standards and ensure to the standards ensure reliable
information.
The Basle Committee suggests the following broad categories of information should be
disclosed in appropriate detail in order to achieve a satisfactory level of bank transparency
- financial performance
- financial position including capital, solvency and liquidity
- risk management strategies and practices
- risk exposure including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational,
legal and other risks
- accounting policies
- basic business, management and corporate governance information.
18.2. Sound Practices for Loan Accounting, credit risk disclosure and related
matters:
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The Committee considered the aspects of recognition and measurement ofloans,
establishment ofloan loss or bad debt allowances, credit risk disclosure and related
matters. It was found those accounting treatments generally and loan accounting
treatments, in particular, can significantly affect the accuracy of financial and supervisory
reporting and related capital calculations. Moreover, sound accounting and disclosure
practices ensure enhanced transparency that can facilitate the effective supervision and
market discipline of financial institutions.
The Basle Committee found three primary concerns of supervisors are a) the adequacy of
an institution's process for determining allowances, b) the adequacy of the total allowance
and
c) the timely recognition of identified losses through either specific allowances or charge-
offs or write-offs.
18.2.1. Bank's Interaction with Highly Leveraged Institutions
The Basle Committee has noted that in recent years there has been an increase in the
magnitude and complexities of the activities of highly leveraged institutions. Highly
leveraged institutions have been described by the Committee as financial institutions
having the following characteristics, namely; a) they are subject to little or no direct
regulatory oversight, as a significant proportion operate through off-shore financial
centres; b) they are subject to limited disclosure requirements; and c) they take on high
debt in relation to their own means . Further the scope of the interaction between highly
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leveraged institutions and mainstream financial institutions, such as banks and securities
firms has also increased. This has necessitated the need for a full understanding and
management of risks generated from these activities, that is, the risk both to direct
creditors and possibly to the financial system as a whole. They found that the recent near
collapse of the long-term capital management market highlighted the deficiencies in
banking institution's risk management practices with respect to some highly leveraged
institutions. The responsibility rests with banks to manage these risks in a safe and prudent
manner, particularly when considering risk that is prevalent both to direct creditors and to
the financial system as a whole. Further given the potential for systemic disruptions, the
Committee has looked into the aspect of the feasibility of direct regulations of highly
leveraged institutions. This concern appears to be similar to that of local banks trying to
do business with the Small and Medium enterprise market segment. The management of
risk inherent in the SMME sector, only goes to re-iterate the Committee's view that these
risks need to be managed in a safe and prudent manner, following the collapse of Saambou
Bank and the ABSN Unifer debacles .
18.2.2. What are sound practices for Highly Leveraged Institutions?
The following concerns have been identified by the Committee as regards mainstream
banks and the business they have concluded with highly leveraged institutions, namely;
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... in many cases there has not been an appropriate balance among the key elements
of the credit risk management process, with an over reliance placed on security /
collateral;
... insufficient weight was placed on in-depth credit analysis of the HLI involved
and the effective measurement and management of exposures
... in some cases, competitive forces and the desire to conduct business with
certain counterparties may have led to banks to make exceptions to their credit
standards or policies.
The Committee has recommended, the management of the above risk be managed within
the ambit of each bank's credit policy on overall credit management. Further, the report
on settlement procedures and counter-party risk management related to over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement systems in
1998 was thought to be relevant and it was recommended this report be used by banks as
a guide.
18.3. The New Regulatory Capital Framework:
In a brief (Global Banking Brief - Oxford Analtica / Citibank, September 1999), it is
suggested the recent regulatory initiative by the Basle Committee indicate trends towards
a more flexible supervision of banks. That is, the proposed capital framework will promote
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a more accommodating and accurate reflection ofbanking risks in the calculation of
regulatory capital requirements.
The proposals if adopted as initially proposed are likely to lead to result in the following:
.. It is thought global banks are likely to benefit more than domestic banks as the
new proposals will reduce capital costs for banks that have well-developed credit
risk management systems, and large and high quality asset portfolios amenable to
securitisation;
.. the securitised loan market and the use of other credit risk hedging instruments
is expected to grow, as the new framework seems likely to lower capital charges
for this type ofbusiness. In particular, the proposals create a strong incentive for
banks to securitise certain kinds of corporate debt and issue more of certain kinds
of securities,
.. the new rules will probably place more focus on the judgements ofbank
management and perhaps credit rating agencies.
SECTION F : THE APPLICATION OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN S.A.
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Up to this stage, we have covered a broad spectrum of issues ranging from the lack of
access to finance by the SMME market segment in South Africa, possible providers of
finance to this market, how banks presently manage their credit risks, credit derivatives
instruments and whether these instruments hold the answer to hedging the credit risk
inherent in the SMME market segment.
In this section we examine the South African situation more closely. We look at the
present use of credit derivatives in the South African market, whether South Africa can
gain access to a credit derivatives trading platform and whether there will be sufficient
liquidity in the Corporate bond market to facilitate the use of credit derivatives . Further,
we examine some keys issues contained in the South African Reserve Bank's paper on
credit derivatives, whether regulations and policies on credit derivatives are aligned to the
Basle Committee recommendations and if so will this result in domestic financial
institutions looking to focus more on the credit derivatives market. We conclude this
section by examining the thoughts and comments to certain questions posed by the writer
to some local specialists and interested parties in this field.
19.The use of Derivatives in South Africa :
In this section we examine the extent to which derivatives are used in the South African
market. Lynn Bolin (The use ofDerivatives in South Africa :FOW" October 2001)
investigated the recent developments in South Africa and found that recent developments
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in the South African market resulted in the use of derivative instruments becoming more
popular among financial institutions, corporates and traders alike. In particular, the drop in
the Government's borrowing requirements, favourable credit rating outlook and improved
inflation expectations have created a bullish market in bonds and interest rate swaps . At
the same time the volatile equity market pushed more participants into equity derivatives .
It is noted that there have been high levels of interest in structuring and trading credit
derivatives in the first half of200 1.
Bolin notes that contrary to the market trend in other parts ofthe world, a healthy market
in credit derivatives has come about in South Africa, despite the lack of a domestic
corporate bond market. In response to demand from asset managers to invest in higher
yield paper, banks have created synthetic credit-linked notes , which goes some way in
compensating for the absence of a corporate bond market. The notes are similar to bonds
with the credit default risk contained in their structure. Investors have the option of
choosing any amount they want as a recovery value, and Bolin found that they usually opt
for a 0% or 50% recovery in the event of default by the corporate. Pricing ofthe note is
based on the Johannesburg inter-bank accepted rate (JIBAR) , with the spread over JIBAR
determined by the risk associated with the particular company, as measured by credit risk
models employed by Banks.
Bolin found that the local demand for the credit-linked notes is large and unprecedented.
According to the traders the reasons for this are :
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- the drop in Government bond yields over the past six months from just over 12%
to all-time lows under 10%;
- a general shortage of Government bonds;
- a lowering of inflation expectations following the targeting of inflation by the
South African Reserve Bank.
Currently in South Africa four banks are actively trading in credit derivatives, namely,
Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank, GENSEC Bank, ABSA and Investee. It would
also appear likely a few international banks may be looking to become active in this
market. Presently, the low spreads have kept the international banks away from this
market in South Africa. From a local banking perspective, it is noted that present
exchange control rules do not permit local banks to take much oftheir funds offshore .
This has created increased liquidity in the local market that has resulted in too much local
money chasing too few credits. Bolin argues that the relaxation of exchange controls is
likely to lead to a rise in prices and a widening of spreads, which is then likely to attract
international banks to this market.
Standard Corporate & Merchant Bank (SCMB) appears to be the largest trader in credit
derivatives in the local market. According to Ian Sargent, the Head ofCredit Derivatives
at SCMB the bank has completed over R13 billion in trades for roughly the first six
months of200 1. Deal sizes are said to average R50 - R100 million and about four trades a
week are done. There have been a few deals in excess ofR1 billion.
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Regulations governing the credit derivatives market have not yet been finalised by the
South African Reserve Bank (SARB). A working group has however draft proposals that
are based on international best practice and are similar to those used in the UK market.
The report is expected to be finalised shortly. However, it must be noted that the lack of
formal regulations has not hindered trade as it would appear banks are well informed
about risk reporting guidelines and liase closely with the SARB on their derivative
transactions. The development of this new market is likely to see the development of a
liquid and accurately priced corporate bond market in South Africa.
20. Is it possible for an Emerging Market like South Africa to gain access to a Credit
Derivative Trading Platform ?
A new venture for online trading of credit derivatives, creditex INC . announced that is
has raised more than $10 million ofventure funding from five big participants in the credit
derivatives market. The participants included Bank of America Corp., Suisse Group's
Credit Suisse First Boston, Dresdner Kleinwort Benson unit, Societe Generale AG and
UBS AG. The most common form of credit derivative lets a company, such as a Bank buy
credit protection against debt default by another company. Hence Banks use credit
derivatives to hedge their risk to lending to specific clients, while traders use them to place
bets on a company's credit quality.
Until recently, all trading on creditex has been with derivatives for single companies.
However, Societe Generale recently conducted the first portfolio trade on creditex (
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italics mine). The French bank bought $283 million ofcredit protection on 18 corporations
to which it had credit exposure. It marketed the trade anonymously and bought it from
one buyer. Since this trade several other credit portfolios have traded over creditex . In
June 2001, creditex began trading emerging markets debt. The focus thus far has been on
Latin America and Eastern Europe sovereigns and corporates. The site is attempting to
return investor confidence to economies in these regions. Dik Blewitt, Director ofNorth
American marketing in New York, noted that as the economies of emerging markets have
improved, investors have become increasingly more comfortable trading underlying
credits. It is expected that with creditex's entry into this market other new counterparties
would also be attracted which will likely provide more transparency with regards to
pricing and encourage existing players to be more active in the market. At the time of
writing, plans were afoot at creditex to expand its London office's operations into Asia.
However, creditex is not the only online trader in this market. Chase Manhattan Corp.
and Internet Capital Group in July 2001 invested $9.5 million in a rival venture called
CreditTrade, which is operated by Mutant Technology Group in London. CreditTrade
uses a combination ofonline and telephone-based technology.
It seems a likely extension that these trading platforms could be extended to South Africa
as traders gain greater comfort from trading with emerging markets. South Africa has
sound and consistent economic policies entrenched, good corporate governance, a well
developed banking sector and a Government committed to a healthy economy and
globalisation of trade and services.
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21. Does the link-up of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and the London
Stock Exchange present any opportunities to the local financial market?
The Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) recently concluded an important
arrangement with the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which could facilitate South
African companies having dual primary listings in both Johannesburg and London. This is
expected to stop the exodus of South African blue chip companies seeking a primary
listings offshore. Further, the transformation of the JSE into a world class exchange was
boosted when it adopted the trading system ofthe LSE, namely,- Stock Exchange
Electronic Trading Service (SETS). This will allow the JSE access to key technologies
from the LSE as well as easier access to global capital and markets. Whilst the change has
only just been introduced, it is expected in time trading volumes will increase and liquidity
in the market will improve, in particular, in the corporate bond market, as a result of the
link-up with the LSE. The increased level ofliquidity in the corporate bond market
coupled with global trends in the credit derivatives market will likely result in substantially
more trade in credit derivative instruments in the South African Financial Market. This is
likely to be boosted should South Africa continue with its present economic and financial
policies, ensure good governance and continue to develop good infrastructure.
22. South African Reserve Draft Proposal on Credit Derivative Instruments
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The South African Reserve Bank's Annual Report for 2001 contains a section on credit
derivative instruments. In particular, the report notes that the introduction of credit
derivative instruments is a relatively recent innovation in the financial markets . The credit
derivative instrument is seen as a contract in terms ofwhich the credit risk associated with
a financial asset is isolated from the other risks associated with a financial asset. Further,
the credit risk is transferred from one counter-party, the protection buyer to another party,
namely the protection provider / seller. The SARB Annual Report notes that the current
regulatory framework in South Africa does not provide for the use of credit derivatives
instruments in the mitigation of credit risk. Yet, we are aware that certain banks in South
Africa, for example, Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank, GENSEC, ABSA and
Investee are actively trading credit derivatives.
The SARB Report goes on to note that the failure ofbanks has often been the result of
excessive credit exposure to particular borrowers that are vulnerable to the same
economic shocks. Given this understanding the SARB has come to realise that the
development of a market for the transfer of credit risk has the potential to improve the
stability and efficiency of capital markets . Further, credit derivative instruments may
improve the ability ofbanks to separate credit risk from funding. The Report suggests that
global credit derivative instruments outstanding may have been as high as USD 1 trillion at
the end of200 1. Given the potential threat of the exponential growth of the credit
derivatives market to the global financial system, especially in times of economic
downturn, some regulatory authorities appear to have expressed growing concern .
62
The proposed Basle Capital Accord has acknowledged the latest developments in this
market. Following the latest regulatory and market developments around credit
derivatives, The SARB Supervision Department established a working group in order to
formulate legislation for the regulatory treatment of credit derivative instruments in South
Africa. The SARB envisages making changes to the banking legislation to accomodate
credit derivative instruments in 2002. Below, we examine some ofthe issues contained in
the Draft Paper on Credit Derivative Instruments, presently being circulated for comment.
22.1. Key terms defined :
At the time ofwriting this report, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had issued a
draft paper regarding proposed amended regulations to provide for the regulatory and
supervisory treatment of Credit Derivative instruments. Interested parties had until the 30
April 2002 to submit their comments to the SARB. As the official policy and regulations
concerning credit derivative instruments are still being finalised in South Africa, the writer
was unable to obtain any additional comment from the regulators.
In this section, the proposed regulations as contained in the Draft Paper is considered. In
particular, we look at the definitions of the various terms encountered in the credit
derivatives market the SARB has proposed as well as capital adequacy proposals. We
have not deemed it necessary to discuss the proposed changes to the SARB Returns and
Reports required from banks . This is then compared briefly with the Basle Committee
recommendations.
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22.1.1. Proposed Definitions of Key Terms:
The SARB has defined credit-risk mitigation as the reduction ofa bank's credit risk
exposure by obtaining collateral or guarantees or credit derivative instruments. Further,
the Reserve Bank suggests that a reduction in the credit-risk exposure of the reporting
bank will be allowed to the extent that the bank achieves "an effective and verifiable
transfer ofrisk". It would seem the onus shall be on the reporting bank to show that an
effective and verifiable transfer of risk has occurred.
The SARB goes on to note that the term credit derivative instrument is a general term
used to describe various contracts designed to transfer credit risk from one party
(protection buyer) to another part (protection seller). In return, the protection seller
receives a premium or interest-related payment for contracting to make payment to the
protection buyer. Importantly the payments are linked to the credit standing of a reference
asset or assets. The Bank defines two types of credit derivative instruments, namely,
funded credit-derivative instruments and unfunded credit derivative instruments. Funded
credit derivative instruments encompass cash instruments where repayment of the principal
amount is linked to the credit standing of a reference asset. For example, a credit-linked
note issued by a Commercial Bank and linked to a particular credit exposure. The Bank
proposes looking at credit-linked notes in a similar way as it does cash colateralised
transactions for risk mitigation purposes. Unfunded credit derivative instruments provide
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credit protection similar to that of a guarantee, for example, credit default swaps and total
return swaps. Hence, for credit mitigation purposes it is proposed unfunded credit
derivative instruments be treat in a similar way to guarantees.
The SARB considers the term material threshold, which is sometimes embodied in credit
derivative instruments. In essences, such a condition may require a significant loss to be
incurred on the underlying instrument before the credit derivative instrument is triggered.
The SARB has proposed that where the percentage of loss to occur before the protection
seller is obliged to make payment is high, this shall not be recognised for credit-risk
mitigation purposes. This brings us to the definition of settlement. It is noted that
settlement may take the form of cash settlement or physical settlement. Cash settlement
requires a cash settlement to be calculated by a party specified for that purpose in the
contract. The cash settlement amount will be the reference value minus the final value of
the referenced obligation following a credit event. Physical settlement on the other hand
calls for the delivery of an obligation of the underlying referenced entity specified in the
contract in return for the cash settlement of the reference amount. It is noted when
physical settlement occurs, problems normally associated with the valuation of the
reference obligation following a credit event are avoided. At this point is appropriate to
define how the SARB defines as the minimum event for it to be considered as being a
credit event, in terms of, the contract.
A credit event includes bankruptcy, repudiation, any moratorium on the repayment of the
principal or interest amounts due, any application for protection from creditors, payment
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default (failure to pay the principal or interest amounts due), any reduction in the rate or
amount of interest payable or the amount of scheduled interest accruals, any reduction in
the amount of principal or premium payable at maturity or at he scheduled redemption
dates, any change in the ranking of the priority of payment of any obligation - causing the
subordination of such obligation ;and any postponement or other deferral of a date or
dates for either payment or accrual of interest or the payment of principal or premium. We
turn next to examine the proposed risk weighting.
First we consider the risk weighting of the protection buyer or the seller of the credit risk.
The SARB Proposes that where a bank is a protection buyer it may substitute the risk
weighting ofthe underlying or reference credit exposure with the risk weighting relating to
the protection provider or seller. This likely lower risk weighting relating to the protection
seller shall apply to the outstanding amount of the transaction or exposure covered by the
credit derivative instrument provided all the conditions contained therein are adhered to.
Risk weighting, in respect of, the protection seller or the buyer of credit risk treats the
position as if the protection seller has a direct exposure to the reference asset. Further, if
protection is provided by way ofa funded credit-derivative instrument, the protection
seller, upon conclusion of the contract, is exposed to the total credit risk relating to the
referenced asset and the funds placed with the protection buyer. The exposure at risk will
be restricted to the maximum amount specified in the credit derivatives contract. On the
other hand, if the protection seller entered into an unfunded credit derivatives contract the,
seller is exposed to the credit risk ofthe reference asset only. Having defined some of the
key terms pertinent to credit derivative instruments we turn in the next section to discuss
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what the SARB has proposed as the minimum requirements relating to credit derivative
instruments.
22.2. Minimum Requirements relating to Credit-Derivative Instruments:
The SARB categorised the minimum requirements relating to credit-derivative instruments
into general requirement and specific requirements. As a general requirement the SARB
proposes that any bank wishing to engage in credit derivative transactions will need to
obtain the prior written approval of the Exchange Control Department, in respect of, any
such transaction involving a non-resident person. Further, it is proposed that should such
written approval be given then the bank must also adhere to the specific requirements
proposed and discussed below.
The specific requirements allows for protection from a credit derivative contract to be
recognised, in terms of regulations to the extent that (1) such protection was not already
elsewhere in the DI 400 Form and (2) such protection can be realised by the reporting
bank under normal market conditions. In the case of the latter, the following conditions
should be met, namely;
1. the credit protection shall represent a direct claim on the protection provider;
2. the credit protection shall be linked to specific exposures, such that "the extent
of the cover is clearly defined and incontrovertible";
3. there is no clause in the contract that would allow the protection seller to
unilaterally cancel the credit protection;
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4. there is no clause in the contract that could prevent the protection seller from
being obliged to payout in a timely manner;
5. the credit protection shall be legally enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions;
6. the protection seller has no formal recourse to the protection buyer in respect of
losses incurred by the protection seller;
7. in the case of a funded single named credit-derivative contract, the protection
buyer shall have no obligation to repay any funding received from the protection
seller except at termination or as a result of a defined credit event ;
8. Robust risk-management process shall be employed
9. risk management systems of the reporting bank shall be adequate;
10. as a minimum, the credit events defined above shall be included
11. asset mismatch conditions are met.
23. What the specialist in the area had to say :
Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank (SCMB) is the largest player in the South African
credit derivatives market with deals totalling approximately R20 billion have been
concluded. According to Lance Basserabie, a Credit Derivatives Specialist at SCMB, the
rest ofthe credit derivatives market in South Africa makes up for an additional R5 to RIO
billion worth ofnominal contracts. This view is also shared by Munkonge Kafula, a credit
derivatives specialist with Investee Bank, who also estimates the size of the credit
derivatives market in South Africa to be valued at RJO billion.
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In response to the question what is the most common type of credit derivative instrument
used by SCMB, Basserabie advised the credit linked note are used most frequently. In
essence the client sells the protection to the Bank on a reference entity and places the
entire amount on deposit with the Bank at the same time. The note then pays coupons and
a redemption amount. At Investee, credit linked notes and colaterised debt securities were
the most common types of credit derivative instruments employed . Presently, as far as
SCMB are aware the biggest players in the credit derivatives market locally are the major
South African Banks, a few of the international banks operating offices locally, asset
managers, insurers and structuring houses . Kafula also confirmed these market players and
went on to add that Investee sometimes contracted in the credit derivatives market with
international banks with local exposures. It is noted the credit derivatives market is still in
an embryonic stage in South Africa. As such positions are not easy to hedge and most
players provide pricing only on a very limited number of entities. Investee's credit
derivatives specialist, Kafula notes however there is a growing demand for this type of
hedging instrument in the local financial market.
Basserabie advises that due to the lack of corporate bonds available in South Africa, there
is an increased demand for yield enhanced fixed income products through credit
derivatives. In most instances, SCMB finds itselfbeing the protection buyer which results
in a yield pick-up for the client. There has been the occasional request for pricing to hedge
risk on a particular client's exposure. This is expected to increase as more clients become
educated in credit derivatives. SCMB has traded with international protection sellers, in
particular, international banks . However, according to Basserabie, liquidity in this market
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is low due to the lack ofbig player . This then makes positions difficult to hedge and those
that are hedge reflect large spreads. This is a view shred by Investee.
When asked whether credit derivative instruments could be used to effectively hedge the
risk inherent in the SMME market segment, Basserabie felt that currently this was not
possible . He elaborated by saying there is currently no demand for assuming the exposure
of these smaller companies and therefore the risk would not be possible to hedge . It was
likely this would magnify the spread that currently exists on the credit prices of the larger
companies. He then goes on to add that to use credit derivative instruments to effectively
hedge the risk ofthe SMME lending, the corporate bond market in South Africa would
need to be developed more and liquidity and appetite would be necessary .. Kafula is of the
opinion credit derivative instruments can be used the inherent risk found in lending to the
SMME market in the future . He went on to add that this could best be achieved by using
collaterised debt obligations, securitisation and baskets.
Basserabie concluded by noting the credit derivatives market is not yet fully fledged in
South Africa. For this to happen, legislation will need to be passed, market consensus on
standards of trading reached and buy-in from the Authorisation ofUnit Trusts achieved.
Kafula concurred with this opinion also noting that there is only a fledging corporate bond
market in South Africa and enabling legislation for Banks still needed to be finalised
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SECTION G : CONCLUSION:
24. Conclusion :
The objective of this paper was to examine whether credit derivative instruments can be
used in the Small, medium and micro-enterprise market to hedge the inherent risk
Commercial Bankers perceived in lending to this market segment. It has been identified
and recognised that the major banks in South Africa do not have the appetite to lend in
any significant level to the SMME market segment for a host of reasons. This paper notes
some of the following reasons espoused by some banks for not wanting to increase their
exposure to this market significantly, namely, adverse credit records of the people behind
the businesses, the owners f managers have shown instability, in terms of, previous
employment and domicilium and often these parties do not have any collateral ofvalue to
support the facilities requested. In defence ofthe SMME segment, various government
departments and non-governmental organisations have countered that the major banks in
South Africa are more interested in doing business with large and more profitable
corporate clients and in so doing are ignoring their social responsibility to assist the
SMME segment. Some ofthese parties have gone on to argue that these banks do not
possess the expertise and relevant credit models to suitably assess the credit risk of
SMME clientele. In essence, these parties have argued, normal bank lending criteria is not
applicable to the SMME market segment. Thus far the result has been access to finance
for SMMEs has been limited to funds raised through banks where Government acts as a
guarantor by providing certain guarantees and for indemnities, borrowings through micro-
lenders (sometimes at exhorbitant interest rates) and loans secured through family and
friends.
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The Draft Discussion Paper by the Department of Trade and Industry's Centre for Small
Business Promotion (1998) noted the SMME segment contributed to 60% of employment
in the economy and 40% of output. In the light of this and given the importance of the
SMME market to a small, growing economy like South Africa, the author felt it was
important to investigate whether a suitable mechanism or means could be identified, which
had the potential ofunlocking the value in the SMME market and thereby grow the South
African economy at large. The growing popularity of credit derivative instruments
internationally and to some extent locally provided the author with the idea of using a
corporate finance tool, namely credit derivatives, to hedge the risk of a bank's SMME
Loan portfolio (a non-traditional use for credit derivatives). Thus far credit derivatives
have been used by large multi-national corporations, international banks and insurance
companies to hedge corporate and sovereign debt. The study then goes on to highlight
certain constraints to using credit derivatives on a large scale in South Africa. These
constraints include the lack of suitable infrastructure, lack ofliquidity, lack of
transparency, central bank regulations and exchange controls and the lack of a significant
number of large financial institutions in the local market. The focus of the paper then
turned to one of examining whether these constraints could be overcome.
The paper proceeded to examine trends in other developed markets for credit derivatives,
most notably, the United States of America, the UK, India and Australia. The trends noted
were as follows -credit derivative trading platforms were being extended to make them
more accessible to emerging markets, market players were looking for higher returns /
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bigger spreads which allowed for a higher risk appetite and the Basle Committee
recommendations on credit derivatives was gaining acceptance. At the same time it was
noted that credit derivative instruments were being used in more exotic ways thereby
moving beyond the plain vanilla type usage. This presented opportunities for the South
African market to be more innovative in the way credit derivative contracts were
packaged. We also noted the views of some international derivative experts on where the
credit derivatives market was heading . After all if credit derivatives was going to be a
short-term fad, it seems almost pointless in looking in that direction for a medium-term
solution to hedging credit risk in the SMME market. However, the experts in this field
were unanimous in predicting the credit derivatives market is set to grow in leaps and
bounds. Further, following the circulation of the Basle Committee recommendations on
credit derivatives, enabling standards and capital adequacy requirements, uniform
definitions and terminology and supervisory requirements and credit models appeared to
gain wide acceptance. This, we construed as a positive step towards establishing an
enabling framework within which the players in this market could abide by.
The study then proceeded to examine the South African market for credit derivatives more
closely. In particular, the author focused on whether there were developments in the local
economy that would help overcome the constraints we identified in establishing a fully
fledged credit derivatives market in South Africa, in particular, the lack of infrastructure,
liquidity, transparency, Central Bank Regulations and exchange controls. We found there
are developments at the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, in particular the link-up with
the London Stock Exchange and the common SETS trading system to be used, provided
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the South African market with greater opportunity to gain access to liquidity and to grow
our Corporate Bond market. Also, the South African Reserve Bank has currently
circulated a Draft Paper on Credit Derivatives for further discussion and comment. The
paper appears to be closely aligned to the Basle Committee recommendations and as such
it is likely to be in line with international norms . Should this paper be accepted in its
present format, then the enabling regulations and exchange controls shall be put in place,
which will contribute to a growing credit derivatives market in South Africa. This will also
lead to greater transparency following the SARB return and reporting requirements. The
specialists interviewed seem to agree the credit derivatives market in South Africa is still
at an infancy stage. However, given the steps in the pipeline to overcome many ofthese
constraints, the market is likely to grow. Should this occur, there is likely to be
opportunities to use credit derivative instruments to hedge the risk of lending to the
SMME market. In this case, local banks will then assume the role of originators, managers
and distributors of SMME loans, with the risk of default passed on to the protection seller
in return for a premium.
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